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Kant, Proust, and the Appeal of Beauty
Richard Moran
1
A familiar feature of the history of modern aesthetics is the cycle of
suspicion and defensiveness connected with the idea of beauty, as though
its very appearance suggested something exaggerated, something requir-
ing deflation, which then provokes a certain polemical stance on the part
of both its defenders and detractors. People who would not be tempted by
a reductive account of other concepts (for example, of thought, or desire,
or action), may still feel that beauty has to be shown to be illusory or
explained as a mere guise of some other force or quality altogether in the
end. One might, for instance, have reasons to be suspicious of pleasure
itself, its role in culture, or the exaggerated claims for it, or one may have
metaphysical scruples deriving from the idea that beauty can be no prop-
erty of things in themselves but can only be a projection of our own sen-
sibilities upon the world. In different ways, then, there can seem to be a
certain extravagance built into the notion of the beautiful itself, as though
it were internal to its invocation that it claims more for itself than it can
deliver on. Familiar as these thoughts are, however, their import is far from
clear. The thought about projection, for instance, need not be any more
skeptical than the parallel claims that are made about secondary qualities
generally, the supervenience of which on our sensory dispositions is not
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usually taken to be equivalent to their being simply unreal or to be incom-
patible with the idea that in calling the sky blue one is claiming something
beyond one’s subjective experience.1
The idea of beauty, however, can lend itself to repudiation of an-
other kind, as being a perfectly useless concept, the residue of pieties we
can no longer take seriously. And in the life of an individual, something
in the idea of beauty makes possible its characteristic forms of disillu-
sion and not merely disappointment. One may be disappointed with
one’s experience of ordinary pleasures, finding in them less than one
hoped to find or even losing one’s taste altogether for certain of them.
In relation to beauty, however, there is room for the possibility of not
just disappointed expectations but disillusionment and, with that, re-
pudiation of the very idea of beauty, as though the very idea were a form
of mystification. What I take this to show is that the very possibility of
such skepticism is testament to the fact that there is something addi-
tional it would make sense to reject in the claim of beauty, something
beyond the thought that something is a special source of pleasure. It is
only against the background of something supposedly beyond ordinary
pleasure and pain that there is the possibility of rejecting its claim,
finding it perhaps quaint or hollow. With regard to beauty, there seems
to be room for a different kind of rejection of its reality or genuineness
1. Consider this well-known passage:
Attend to Palladio and Perrault, while they explain all the parts and proportions of a pillar.
They talk of the cornice, and frieze, and base, and entablature, and shaft, and architrave;
and give the description and position of each of these members. But should you ask the
description and position of its beauty, they would readily reply, that the beauty is not in any
of the parts or members of a pillar, but results from the whole, when that complicated fig-
ure is presented to an intelligent mind, susceptible to those finer sensations. Till such a
spectator appear, there is nothing but a figure of such particular dimensions and propor-
tions: from his sentiments alone arise its elegance and beauty. [David Hume, An Inquiry
into the Principles of Morals (Middlesex, 2006), p. 81]
Here Hume seems to derive a claim about the subjectivity of beauty from the common fact
of the constitution of one set of properties by another. Palladio could just as rightly say that the
strength of the pillar is not in any of its parts or members, but it would hardly follow from this
that its strength was somehow unreal or a mere projection of the sentiments.
R I CHARD MORAN is the Brian D. Young Professor of Philosophy at Harvard
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or the thought that it can’t be and never was all that it presents itself as
being.2
There is, however, another related set of reasons why the concept of
beauty is subject to forms of skepticism peculiar to it. Far more than most
other concepts of philosophical interest the idea of beauty has a well-
developed culturalmythology that is asmuch a part of it as are any theories
of it that have been proposed. Indeed, the competing philosophical theo-
ries themselves have little point taken in isolation from the various depic-
tions of the encounter with beauty thatmake their appearance throughout
the Western tradition, from Plato to the Christian era, through romanti-
cism, modernism, and whatever comes after that. Part of what I mean by
mythology is that these ideas are something like a common cultural re-
source, that they inform our actual experience and thinking about the
thing in question, and are for that reason to be seen as belonging to
the concept itself, whether part of its literal or figurative content. There
needn’t be anything elaborate in such depictions, so let me begin with
some simple examples, neither original nor exhaustive. So, for instance,
beauty is commonly associated with mystery, as something that beckons
but also withdraws and withholds, something whose nature belongs with
appearing but that also presents itself as containing in itself more than is
apparent. While it belongs to the sensory, to the realm of feeling, and is in
that sense fully present to experience, at the same time it partakes of con-
cealment in ways not shared by the rest of sensory life. A familiar trope of
beauty is that of something not just pointing beyond itself but as harboring
a secret or posing a question to be answered. And this is itself one of the
classic settings for the disappointment and disillusion associated with
beauty. A running theme in Marcel Proust’s Swann’s Way, for instance, is
the repeated frustration of the narrator in his attempts to penetrate the
secret that seems to be held by the scenes he finds most enthralling, which
seem to pose a question that he cannot formulate, let alone answer.3
The beautiful not only beckons but also charms, enthralls, and other-
2. Or compare beauty with ordinary pleasure and pain with regard to the possibility of
error. Given the appearance of pleasure or pain, it is hard to imagine a place for a further
question about its genuineness or reality. Given the appearance of beauty, we may later come to
question its genuineness or reality and perhaps come to the conclusion that the appearance of
beauty here was a false one. It didn’t hold up to scrutiny; its promise was false or meretricious.
If this is right, then beauty, unlike pain or pleasure, is not a property whose esse is percepi. And
it raises the question of what sort of scrutiny it is that could show that an apparent beauty was
in fact false, or what further question that appearance would have to answer to show itself to be
real. (Kant, of course, takes up such questions in terms of the conditions for a pure judgment of
taste.)
3. Here he is, early in the story, after one of his recurrent moments of despair of ever being
equal to his literary vocation:
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wise captivates its beholder. The tradition of describing something beau-
tiful in such grammatically active aesthetic verbs as compelling, enticing, or
appealing is both part of ordinary speech and a way of depicting the en-
counter with the beautiful object as somehow two-sided, involving an
active element on the side of the object itself to which the beholder actively
responds. This can be a perfectly anodyneway of talking, of course, and the
metaphorical residue thoroughly effaced and without force, but even as
dead metaphor such discourse registers a difference from other response-
dispositional concepts, such as red, and highlights the idea of a type of
response that the beautiful object calls for or makes appropriate. Whether
we think of the active verbs in this context as simply dead metaphors or as
the result of projection on the part of the beholder, their presence also
suggests a difference in the kind of response the beholder may feel obliged
to summon in the face of the object, a responsiveness of a different kind
from that involved in making correct color judgments. Along the same
lines, though less anodyne, the use of such active aesthetic vocabulary
applied to the object belongs to the tradition of seeing something animated
or animating in the experience of the beautiful or in the actual thing found
beautiful.4Here again, ImmanuelKant is no stranger to this tradition, both
in the association of beauty with the arousal of the “quickening” powers of
the mind (most especially and obscurely the “free play of the cognitive
powers [imagination andunderstanding]”) andmore generally in the con-
Then, quite independently of all these literary preoccupations and in no way connected
with them, suddenly a roof, a gleam of sunlight on a stone, the smell of a path would make
me stop still, to enjoy the special pleasure that each of them gave me, and also because they
appeared to be concealing, beyond what my eyes could see, something which they invited
me to come and take, but which, despite all my efforts, I never managed to discover. Since I
felt that this something was to be found in them, I would stand there, motionless, looking,
breathing, endeavouring to penetrate with my mind beyond the thing seen or smelt. [Mar-
cel Proust, Swann’s Way, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (New York,
1992), pp. 251–52; hereafter abbreviated SW]
4. “In this glum desert, suddenly a specific photograph reaches me; it animates me, and I
animate it. So that is how I must name the attraction which makes it exist: an animation
(Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard [London,
1981], p. 20). The connection of beauty with the ideas of life-likeness and animation is thematic
in Elaine Scarry’s On Beauty and Being Just and is part of her account of the thought that the
beautiful object calls for certain forms of treatment, the way a living thing would: “The almost
aliveness of a beautiful object makes its abrasive handling almost unthinkable” (Elaine Scarry,
On Beauty and Being Just [Princeton, N.J., 2001], p. 69; see also pp. 89–93, 110).
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nections drawn between beauty and the purposive in living nature, be-
tween aesthetic and teleological judgment.5
In many canonical representations, the encounter with beauty takes
place against the background of its transience and perishability. “Death is
the mother of beauty,” Wallace Stevens says at the end of “Sunday Morn-
ing,”6 and in this he is giving voice to a long tradition of thinking of beauty
alongside its relation to time and destruction, which is also part of thinking
of it as essentially fleeting, eluding one’s grasp, impossible to possess. Plea-
sures quite generally may be fleeting, but talk of beauty makes it almost a
sign of its own relation to death, either as submitting to it or promising to
outlast it. This is connected with the sense of the special possibilities of
damage there are with respect to beauty: it not only fades, like other plea-
sures, but is also the sort of thing that can be defaced or disfigured. Beauty
is subject to the possibility of ruin and not just interruption or decline. The
characteristic relation of beauty to special possibilities of loss expresses
itself both in the association of beauty with ideas of irreplaceability, taking
beauty out of the ordinary economy of exchange and substitution (and
hence toward the possibility of absolute, unrecoverable loss), and also to
the tradition of thinking of the experience of beauty as promising to defeat
death or defeat time somehow. That is, beauty also figures in the guise of
something redeeming or compensating for the finitude or perishability of
other values, particularly as contrasted with other pleasures. This part
of the myth of beauty is surely part of what is repudiated in some of the
forms of skepticism about beauty mentioned earlier, the thought that the
sheer contingent existence of beauty in the world somehow makes up for
other failings or losses or shows them to be less real than beauty itself.7 In
their very different ways, both Kant and Proust take the improbable ap-
pearance of beauty in our experience of the world as requiring explanation
in terms of something else, as pointing to either our fitness for moral life
and theworld’s possible conformity tomoral good, as inKant, or, as a kind
of liberation from subjectivity in Proust, from the natural solipsism of
desire as appetite.
Finally, both in philosophy and elsewhere, beauty is associated with
enhanced stakes for the question of the communicability of experience,
5. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, 2000), §9,
pp. 63, 62; hereafter abbreviated CJ.
6. Wallace Stevens, “Sunday Morning,” Selected Poems, ed. John N. Serio (New York,
2009), p. 44.
7. For a sophisticated critique of the redemptive claims of art, rather than beauty generally,
see Leo Bersani, “‘The Culture of Redemption’: Marcel Proust and Melanie Klein,” Critical
Inquiry 12 (Winter 1986): 399–421.
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not only as problematizing such communication but as making more ur-
gent the question of howmuch can be communicated one to another and
the situations in which its success can be peculiarly fraught or urgent.
Beautymay lay no exclusive claim to the idea of the ineffable in experience,
but it is surely central to it, and this thought relates beauty both to diffi-
culties in the notion of communication itself, to the incurably private in
experience, and to the specific needs of the shareability of experience that
arise in aesthetic contexts. The issue of communication includes but is not
restricted to the question of finding we agree in our particular aesthetic
judgments and also includes the conditions for various forms of disagree-
ment. The relation to beauty can form communities of people and can also
isolate them from each other. Nothing is more characteristic of the aes-
thetic than being bored or repelled by what enthralls someone else. And if
being gripped by beauty can sometimes make possible certain forms of
communication that were not previously imagined, it also belongs to its
experience to tend toward obsession, absorption, and the walling-off of
one consciousness from others.8
While his systematic, critical concerns dictate much of the place that
aesthetic judgment occupies in his philosophy, Kant is in one way or an-
other responsive to all of this andmore in the broadermyth of beauty, and
several of his central claims can be understood as attempts to render parts
of it intelligible inmore abstract and systematic terms. (The place of beauty
in Kant’s philosophy is in these ways part of but not restricted to what he is
responding to in romanticism.) Here I will be concentrating on his fram-
ing of the central paradox of the judgment of beauty, how it is that some-
thing based on the purely subjective experience of pleasure and without
the support of concepts or rules could claim universal validity for itself.
While this paper does present itself as an interpretation of a central strain
inKant’s account of the judgment of beauty, there ismuch in his argument
to which I will give scant attention (particularly the role of transcendental
psychology and the “freeplay of the faculties”); and in addition I will argue
for departures from his account at some central places, so central that
some may wonder how much of Kant remains in the story. The point of
reading Kant in connection with Proust has not been simply to use the
novelist as a corrective to the philosopher, although the paper is indeed
written from the perspective that it should be beyond question thatMarcel
Proust is at least as decisive a thinker about the nature of beauty as is
8. See especially Stanley Cavell, “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,”Must We
Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (Cambridge, 1976), and Arata Hamawaki, “Kant on
Beauty and the Normative Force of Feeling,” Philosophical Topics 34 (Spring–Fall 2006): 107–44.
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Immanuel Kant. It is just asmuch the point, however, that Proust can help
us to seewhat is deeply right, or nearly so, inKant’s outlook, as well as what
Kant wants from the concept of beauty, even if it can’t be had exclusively
from the materials he allows himself.
2
A judgment of taste determines its object in respect of our liking
(beauty), [but] makes a claim [Anspruch] to everyone’s assent, as if it
were an objective judgment.
To say, This flower is beautiful, is tantamount to a mere repetition
of the flower’s own claim [Anspruch] to everyone’s liking. The agree-
ableness of its smell, on the other hand, gives it no claims [Anspru¨che]
whatever; its smell delights . . . one person, it makes another dizzy. In
view of this . . . must we not suppose that beauty has to be considered
a property of the flower itself, which does not adapt itself to differ-
ences in people’s heads and all their senses, but to which they must
adapt themselves if they wish to pass judgment on it? [CJ, §32, p. 145;
trans. mod.]
Sagen: diese Blume ist schön, heisst eben so viel, als ihren eigenen
Anspruch auf jedermanns Wohlgefallen ihr nur nachsagen.
Anspruch: claim, title, right, demand.
ansprechen: speak to, accost, address, appeal to.
ansprechend: pleasing, attractive, appealing, engaging.
Many writers on aesthetics recognize a special question about the nor-
mativity of the judgment of beauty, insofar as this is different from the
judgment of something as agreeable or pleasant. In a familiar sense there is
a normative dimension to any empirical judgment, in that there are con-
ditions for going right or going wrong, and if one is in the business of
making such judgments one is obliged to conform one’s judgment to the
conditions of correctness. This much applies to the judgment of some-
thing as red as much as it does to judging it beautiful. But although we can
specify the conditions necessary for someone to be in a position to make a
correct color judgment (adequate or normal lighting, attending carefully
enough, and so on), they do not, as it were, commend anyone to get them-
selves into those conditions. The world is full of opportunities for correct
empirical judgments to which we may be legitimately indifferent. And the
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red or square objects around us are not awarded that title as a term of
praise or admiration. The idea of beauty, however, according to Kant and
much of the tradition, does not simply specify the conditions one must
satisfy in order to make such a judgment correctly but also involves the
claim that the object in questionmerits this response, that it deserves one’s
attention and that anyone attending to it properly ought to respond with
pleasure and admiration. These are dimensions of normative assessment
that are not part of the concept of an object’s being red or square. The idea
of beauty may well contain conditions for correct judgment, just as there
arewith the judgment of color (andKant has hiswell-known specifications
of these in terms of disinterest, attention to form, and so on), but these do
not exhaust the normative dimension of the judgment of beauty. For
with regard to beauty the idea of the object meriting or calling for a
response from us seems to be what is primary, a norm of responsiveness
that is prior to the obligation the response shares with ordinary empir-
ical judgments of conforming to certain conditions for correct judg-
ment. And any particular form of normative requirement—whether
moral, prudential, or cognitive—brings its own particular possibilities
of falling short, of failure to conform to its own demands.
Both Kant and Proust are concerned with a sense of requirement or
obligation in connectionwith the experience of the beautiful and see this as
the primary difference between the beautiful and the (merely) agreeable or
pleasant. For Kant, the requirement is described as something directed
outwards, toward other people, in that we speak of the beautiful as such
only when we are not speaking merely for ourselves but are prepared to
demand the agreement of all others.
Many things may be charming and agreeable to him; no one cares
about that. But if he proclaims something to be beautiful, then he
requires the same liking from others; he then judges not just for him-
self but for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of
things. That is why he says: The thing is beautiful, and does not count
on other people to agree with his judgment of liking on the ground
that he has repeatedly found them agreeing with him; rather he de-
mands [fordern] that they agree. He reproaches them if they judge
differently, and denies that they have taste, which he nevertheless de-
mands of them, as something they ought to have. [CJ, §7, pp. 55–56]
The language here couldn’t bemore emphatic as to its imperatival quality,
but insofar as the demand in question is a demand to others (however
hypothetical their presence) that they agree in liking the beautiful object, it
raises the question of what the basis could be for such a demand, what
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there is in this demand that another person might be bound to respect.
That is, what could it be that places this person in a position to issue such
a demand? It cannot be simply his personal authority, a possibility that
Kant in any case is at great pains to reject. Rather, it would seem that, as
with the issuing ofmoral or prudential demands, the person is in a position
to make such a demand only because he recognizes himself as subject to a
requirement here, to be under an obligation. The source of the outward-
directed requirement on others in these cases can only be his own ac-
knowledgment of the obligations of the moral law or the maxims of
practical reason. But in the case of someone prepared to require the agree-
ment of all others in his liking or pleasure in connectionwith something he
finds beautiful, it is difficult to see what could ground his own sense of
requirement or obligation with respect to that thing such that it could be
the basis for the imperative he directs to others.9
In one sense this question of the normative force of this demand di-
rected to others is not a problem for Proust; he does not understand the
beautiful in terms of a demand for universal agreement and in fact is more
inclined to relate the validity of the claim of the beautiful to what is indi-
vidualizing and even potentially isolating in such an experience. But if he
does not have to face the question of what the source of the demand for
agreement from others could be, he does at the same time insist on a sense
of obligation or requirement as characteristic of the experience of the
beautiful. Here is the young Marcel, early in the story, saying goodbye to
his beloved hawthorns, whose claim on him he will retain through all the
volumes of In Search of Lost Time.
That year my family fixed the day of their return to Paris rather earlier
than usual. On the morning of our departure . . . my mother, after
searching everywhere for me, found me standing in tears on the steep
little path close to Tansonville, bidding farewell to my hawthorns,
clasping their sharp branches in my arms. . . . “Oh, my poor little
hawthorns,” I was assuring them through my sobs, “it isn’t you who
want to make me unhappy, to force me to leave you. You, you’ve
9. Kant uses a variety of terms to express the sense of something required or exacted in the
judgment of beauty. The verbs that get variously translated as “require,” “demand,” and so on
include fordern, verlangen, ansinnen (“We must begin by fully convincing ourselves that in
making a judgment of taste [about the beautiful] we require [ansinnen] everyone to like the
object” [CJ, §214, p. 57] and zumuten (“For as to the agreeable we allow everyone to be of a
mind of his own, no one requiring [zumuten] others to agree with his judgment of taste. But in
a judgment of taste about beauty we always require others to agree” [CJ, §214, p. 57]). See Paul
Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), pp. 123–30 for a helpful
discussion. I have also been instructed on this topic by a conversation with Rolf-Peter
Horstmann, for which I am grateful.
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never done me any harm. So I shall always love you.” And, drying my
eyes, I promised them . . . I would never copy the foolish example of
other men, but that even in Paris, on fine spring days, instead of pay-
ing calls and listening to silly talk, I would set off for the country to
see the first hawthorn-trees in bloom. [SW, pp. 203–4]
So declares the narrator, whom for our purposes we may call Marcel, and
naturally he breaks this promise to the hawthorns quite soon, and thou-
sands of pages later he is still absorbed with paying calls in Paris and lis-
tening to silly talk. That isn’t the end of the story, of course, and in his own
way and in his own sweet time he remains faithful to his hawthorns, in the
writing and remembering itself and their constant return to Combray.
Encounters and declarations like this one to the hawthorns are the begin-
nings of his vocation as a writer. In this passage and others in Proust, we
have a representative expression of the experience of beauty, and indeed
much of the rest of the long novel is about his efforts and failures to keep
faith with his early formative experiences of the beautiful.10 But to say even
this much is already to risk losing critical perspective and speak from
rather than about the consciousness of young Marcel; for, really, what
sense could there possibly be in “keeping faith” with anything like a bunch
of hawthorn trees in bloom, however beautiful, as if one could have obli-
gations of some sort with respect to them? Well, for that matter, how is it
that he takes himself to be addressing the hawthorns in the first place,
bidding farewell, making to them a declaration of love, promising them to
come see them again?
For all the appearance of excessiveness in this passage (the mode of
excess being Proust’s own), it stands as a representative expression of the
10. To underscore that Proust is indeed describing an aesthetic encounter here, I refer to his
introduction to this scene eight pages earlier, where the language is unmistakable:
And then I returned to the hawthorns, and stood before them as one stands before those
masterpieces of painting which, one imagines, one will be better able to “take in” when one
has looked away for a moment at something else; but in vain did I make a screen with my
hands, the better to concentrate upon the flowers, the feeling they aroused in me remained
obscure and vague, struggling and failing to free itself, to float across and become one with
the flowers. They themselves offered me no enlightenment, and I could not call upon any
other flowers to satisfy this mysterious longing. And then, inspiring me with that rapture
which we feel on seeing a work by our favorite painter quite different from any of those that
we already know, or, better still, when we are shown a painting of which we have hitherto
seen no more than a pencilled sketch, or when a piece of music which we have heard only
on the piano appears to us later clothed in all the colours of the orchestra, my grandfather
called me to him, and, pointing to the Tansonville hedge, said to me: “You’re fond of haw-
thorns; just look at this pink one—isn’t it lovely?” [SW, p. 195]
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experience of beauty, even in its indulgence in language and attitudes nor-
mally reserved for our relations with other persons. We often speak of the
beautiful in terms of something appealing to us or demanding of our
attention, and the pleasure we may experience in something beautiful
raises the issue of its calling for that pleasure or that attention, in a way that
does not apply to other things that may arrest our attention or gratify our
senses. Even the highly strung, overemotional Marcel does not talk this
way about the pleasures of eating or drinking, however discriminating his
palate and however fine-grained his attention to experience. The things we
consume, however intense their pleasures may be, raise no questions of
something that might be betrayed or kept faith with, a claim or a call that
might be answered or ignored. If there really is a difference between what
Kant calls the pleasure in the beautiful and the pleasure in the agreeable,
this is not a difference in the degrees of pleasure taken, for the pleasure in
the beautiful itself can be something faint or flickering, while the experi-
ence of the merely agreeable can itself be overpowering. Rather than a
difference in the quality or intensity of pleasure, the distinctionKant has in
mind is a difference in attitude we take toward something we consider
beautiful and consequently a difference in the type of judgment one is
prepared to make on behalf of the thing we find beautiful—or so I shall
argue. More specifically, I hope to show that Kant’s emphasis on the de-
mand for universal agreement to distinguish the judgment of the beautiful
from the judgment of the agreeable is not in fact primary but is derived
from a prior sense of necessity or demand that characterizes the experience
of the beautiful itself. In short, universal agreement doesn’t always matter
(aesthetics and ethics are not one), but the sense of the beautiful making a
claim upon us does, and this much is derivable from Kant’s initial distinc-
tion between the beautiful and the agreeable.
The agreeableness of Canary wine and the beauty of a landscape or a
work of art are both given expression in what Kant calls a judgment of
taste. Both types of judgment of taste are based on a feeling of pleasure (or
displeasure) and hence are subjective in the sense of denoting nothing in
the object itself, not simply because the judgment is based on sensation,
but more specifically because the particular sensation of pleasure is simply
of the wrong sort to be a possible property of the object itself. Neither type
of judgment is based on concepts or reasoned to as the conclusion of some
inference or argument but instead depends on one’s own direct experience
of the thing in question. As a consequence, neither kind of judgment of
taste can bemade on the authority of someone else’s report or grounded in
another person’s judgment or testimony.
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The fact that others have liked something can never serve him as a
basis for an aesthetic judgment. If others make a judgment that is un-
favorable to us, this may rightly make us wonder about our own judg-
ment, but it can never convince us that ours in incorrect. Hence there
is no empirical basis of proof that could compel anyone to make
[some] judgment of taste.
Second, still less can a judgment about beauty be determined by an
a priori proof, in accordance with determinate rules. . . .
It seems that this is one of the main reasons why this aesthetic
power of judging was given that very name: taste. For even if someone
lists all the ingredients of a dish, pointing out that I have always found
each of them agreeable, and goes on to praise this food—and rightly
so—as wholesome, I shall be deaf to all these reasons: I shall try the
dish onmy tongue and palate, and thereby (and not by universal
principles) make my judgment. [CJ, §33, pp. 147–48]
This is one dimension of the judgment of taste that Kant refers to under
the title of autonomy. Under this aspect the judgment of taste is indepen-
dent of both the judgments of other people and the rational determination
of concepts. It may be that “as a rule” I do like foods of a certain kind, a
kind that is determined by the applicability of certain concepts, but I can be
disappointed in my expectations here and fail to find pleasure where I
usually do. And more importantly, Kant argues, there is nothing in the
normative aspect of a rule that obliges me to take pleasure in something I
find not to my liking, even if I agree that it fits the description of the kind
of thing that as a rule I do like. Logical or conceptual inconsistency has no
grip here; there is nothing that would obligeme to bringmy tastes into line
with what is suggested by the concept or description of the thing in ques-
tion. The normative center of gravity lies in one’s own direct experience of
the thing, what Kant calls apprehensio, and it cannot be overruled either by
the concepts that the thing falls under or by the testimony of others.
In the “On theMethod of theDeduction and Judgments of Taste,” Kant
sums up this feature of the judgment of taste in the following way:
its universal validity is not to be established by gathering votes and
asking other people what kind of sensation they are having; but it
must rest, as it were, on an autonomy of the subject who is making a
judgment about the feeling of pleasure . . . i.e., it must rest on his own
taste; and yet it is also not to be derived from concepts. [CJ, §31, p.
144]
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Moreover, whenever a subject offers a judgment as proof of his taste . . .
we demand that he judge for himself: he should not have to grope
about among other people’s judgments by means of experience, to
gain instruction in advance from whether they like or dislike that ob-
ject. . . . That is why a young poet cannot be brought to abandon his
persuasion that his poem is beautiful, neither by the judgment of his
audience nor by that of his friends. . . . Taste lays claim merely to au-
tonomy; but to make other people’s judgments the basis determining
one’s own would be heteronomy. [CJ, §32, pp. 145–46; my emphasis]
At first glance, there is undoubtedly something arresting in Kant of all
people using the term autonomy to describe a context of judgment that is
independent of the determination of rules or principles. Surely it is Kant
who has shown most forcefully that freedom cannot be understood as
anything like the mere absence of all constraint or principle (empirical or
normative), for that would abolish the distinction between acting and
being acted upon.11 Rather, the very idea of acting freely means acting for
some reason, which means acting in conformity with a law or principle
that one gives oneself, which is what autonomy means. For now, let’s just
note this as a stress that the Kantian idea of autonomy is subjected to early
in the analysis of the judgment of taste. More immediately, I want to point
out that this sense of the autonomy of the judgment of taste applies equally
to the agreeable as to the beautiful. That is to say, neither one’s judgment
about the Canary wine nor one’s judgment about the beautiful song or
beautiful scene are normatively determined by principles or conceptual
requirements, but can only be grounded in one’s own apprehensio of the
thing in question. This is important to bear in mind, for Kant also speaks
of freedom and autonomy in characterizing the specific difference between
the judgment of the agreeable and the judgment of the beautiful. This latter
sense of autonomy is related to a sense of obligation that applies only to the
pleasure in the beautiful and not the agreeableness of the Canarywine. The
pleasure or displeasure taken in the Canary winemay not be compelled by
rational or conceptual requirements, but this pleasure surely is compelled
by something else, namely, the force of inclination, desire, and need. Our
relation to the agreeable is determined by and in the service of our char-
acter as needy human animals, whereas the pure judgment of taste, the
experience of something as beautiful, is independent both of our more
basic biological inclinations and of the rational interests to which they give
11. See in particular Kant, “Transition from the Metaphysics of Morals to the Critique of
Pure Practical Reason,” Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor
(Cambridge, 1997), pp. 52–66.
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rise. In this way, the pleasure in the agreeable is a pleasure that is essentially
in bondage. As a form of valuation, it possesses no independent validity of
its own, for it is in the service of other, previously given ends with respect
to which we are passive. For Kant, a liking or a taking pleasure in some-
thing that is an expression of our freedom is only possible when its condi-
tions are independent not only of conceptual determination but also of
determination by any desire or interest we may happen to bring to the
experience.
His liking is not based on any inclination he has . . . rather, the judg-
ing person feels completely free as regards the liking he accords the
object. [CJ, §6, p. 54]
We may say that, of all these three kinds of liking, only the liking in-
volved in the taste for the beautiful is disinterested and free, since we
are not compelled to give our approval by any interest, whether of
sense or of reason. So we might say that [the term] liking, in the three
cases mentioned, refers to inclination, or to favor [Gunst], or to re-
spect. For FAVOR is the only free liking. Neither an object of inclina-
tion, nor one that a law of reason enjoins on us as an object of desire,
leaves us the freedom to make an object of pleasure for ourselves out
of something or other. [CJ, §5, p. 52]
Thus, both the judgmentof the agreeable and the judgmentof thebeautiful
are free and autonomous with respect to both conceptual requirements and
the judgments of other people. But thepure aesthetic judgment, the judgment
of something as beautiful is also free in an additional sense, in that it is disin-
terested, that is, free from the compulsion or determination of desire, interest,
or need. Thus, the famous Kantian insistence on the disinterestedness of the
judgmentofbeautyas theprimary featuredistinguishing it fromthe judgment
of the agreeable is an aspect of what he calls the freedomof the pure judgment
of taste. The pleasure in the beautiful is autonomous in the sense of answering
only to itself and its own conditions, andnot to those of any antecedent desire
or interest wemay have.
3
This aspect of the autonomy belonging to the judgment of the beautiful
is the expression of a difference in the attitude we take toward the objects
we find beautiful, as contrasted with the things we find agreeable, gratify-
ing, or the contrary. The beautiful is something that indeed gives pleasure,
butwe donot relate to it as something that simply answers to our purposes,
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something to be consumed, used up, and disposed of. This thought has
sourcesmore ancient thanKant and a varied afterlife as well. SimoneWeil,
for instance, strikes a characteristic note of self-denial when she says, “the
beautiful is a carnal attraction which keeps us at a distance and implies a
renunciation. . . . We want to eat all the other objects of desire. The beau-
tiful is that which we desire without wishing to eat it. We desire that it
should be.”12 But what is renounced in the experience of the beautiful (as
contrasted with the agreeable) is not desire or gratification themselves;
rather it is the authority and force of one’s presently constituted desires
and interests, which are instead to be given over to and guided by the
confrontation with something outside them, independent of them. Here
preservation is contrasted with consumption, and we can see here the
primal distinction Kant is appealing to between what we take inside and
incorporate and what we stand before and behold. We might also say: We
stand back from the beautiful, as with an object of respect or as with some-
thing displayed or held in regard, whereas the agreeable is something we
pick up, consume, and forget about. G.W. F.Hegel is explicitly responding
to Kant in his Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics and stages the encounter
of desiring consciousness with the world in terms of the same opposition
between what is taken inside and thus destroyed, and what is encountered
within the world and thus preserved. In so doing he pursues further the
relation between what is autonomous in the judgment of beauty and what
is autonomous in the beautiful itself:
In this appetitive relation to the outer world, the man stands as a sen-
suous particular over against the things as likewise particulars . . . and
preserves himself in them, inasmuch as he uses them, consumes
them, and puts in act his self-satisfaction by sacrificing them to it. . . .
Just as little is it possible for desire to let the object subsist in its free-
dom. For its impulse urges it just precisely to destroy this indepen-
dence and freedom of external things, and to show that they are only
there to be destroyed and consumed. But, at the same time, the sub-
ject himself, as entangled in the particular limited and valueless inter-
ests of his desires, is neither free in himself, for he does not determine
himself out of the essential universality and rationality of his will, nor
free in relation to the outer world, for his desire remains essentially
determined by things and related to them. This relation of desire is
not that in which man stands to the work of art. He allows it to sub-
12. Simone Weil, “Beauty,” The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas (Wakefield,
R.I., 1977), p. 378.
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sist as an object, free and independent, and enters into relation with it
apart from desire.13
What the criterion of disinterestedness means in Kant is that the beautiful
object is something that is liked for its own sake and not just insofar as it
answers to our antecedent needs, desires, and interests. The immediately
striking thing in Hegel’s language is that he describes the situation as
though the idea of liking an object “for its own sake” meant not simply
liking noninstrumentally (which in one sense would apply to the relation
to the agreeable as much as to the beautiful) but also as though the beau-
tiful thing14 had an independent life of its own to which we had to adapt
ourselves. For here and elsewhere he writes not only of the freedom in the
conditions of the judgment of the beautiful (freedom from determination
by desire and interest) but also of the freedom of the beautiful object
itself—something in it, therefore, that we may respect or fail to respect.
And yet, for all the extravagance of his language here, Hegel is giving ex-
pression to an idea that recurs in the history of aesthetics, the sense that
what is regarded as beautiful is not experienced as a passive thing or as
something that merely produces an effect in us but rather as inviting or
requiring something from us, a response that may be owed to it.15 And in
fact in this Hegel is responding to a central feature of Kant’s view of what
is distinctive about the beautiful that has not yet entered our account here,
which is the necessity that applies to the pleasure in the beautiful as con-
trasted with that of the agreeable. The Fourth Moment of the Analytic of
the Beautiful, on themodality of the pure judgment of taste, is summed up
by Kant in saying, “Beauty is what without a concept is cognized [erkannt]
as the object of a necessary liking” (CJ, §62, p. 240). Without yet inquiring
how there could be such objects of necessary liking, and necessary for
whom, we can see that the freedom or autonomy of the pleasure in the
beautiful (its independence from desire or interest) must somehow be the
ground of a necessity in the response to the beautiful, for neither this au-
13. G. W. F. Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, trans. Bernard Bosanquet, ed.
Michael Inwood (London, 1993), p. 41.
14. Or more properly, the work of art, for here Hegel departs significantly from Kant in
giving primacy to artistic beauty over natural beauty.
15. Here is Ludwig Wittgenstein, complaining about the language of producing effects, in
connection with aesthetic matters, with the implication that the work of art is an instrumental
means to an antecedent end or need: “There is a tendency to talk about ‘the effect of a work of
art’—feelings, images, etc. Then it is natural to ask: ‘Why do you hear this minuet?’and there is
a tendency to answer: ‘To get this and that effect.’ And doesn’t the minuet itself
matter?—Hearing this, would another have done as well?” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and
Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett [Maldon, Mass.,
1966], p. 29).
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tonomy nor any necessity at all applies to the pleasure taken in the merely
agreeable. And it is this aspect of the pure judgment of taste that allows for
the particular normativity in responding to the beautiful, something we
may respect or fail to respect, a normativity that does not apply either to
the pleasure of the agreeable or to ordinary empirical judgments such as
those of color.
The necessity attaching to the response to the beautiful that distin-
guishes it from the response to themerely agreeable is reflected in the sense
of requirement or demand that, for Kant, is the fundamental difference
between the judgment of the taste of reflection, which applies to what
we find beautiful, and the taste of sense, which applies to what we find
agreeable or gratifying. For, according to Kant, the defining difference of
the judgment of the beautiful is that, despite its independence of the re-
quirements of concepts or principles, it nonetheless lays claim to universal
validity. When speaking of something I find pleasant or agreeable, I am
content to speak merely for myself and simply say that I like it, but if I am
prepared to call something beautiful it is part of the very meaning of the
judgment I mean to express that I present myself as speaking with what
Kant calls a universal voice.16 This universal voice has the character of a
demand for or a requirement of the same liking or favoring fromothers. So
fundamental is this difference that Kant claims it would never occur to
anyone to speak of beauty in the first place, rather than speak indifferently
of any source of pleasure (without a concept), unless we intended this
requirement of universal assent to our judgment.
We must begin by fully convincing ourselves that in making a judg-
ment of taste (about the beautiful) we require [ansinnen] everyone to
like the object, yet without this liking’s being based on a concept
(since then it would be the good), and that this claim to universal
validity belongs so essentially to a judgment by which we declare
something to be beautiful that it would not occur to anyone to use
this term without thinking of universal validity; instead, everything
we like without a concept would then be included with the agreeable.
For as to the agreeable we allow everyone to be of a mind of his own,
16. Cavell’s “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy” is still the best introduction to
Kant’s idea of speaking with a universal voice. As will be seen, I think that actual universality is
the wrong direction for the communication of the judgment of beauty, but elsewhere in that
same essay Cavell makes the connection between aesthetic experience and communities smaller
than that of universal humanity, between myself and others of my flesh, as he likes to say. The
community that matters for the communicability and validity of a judgment of taste is less like
universal humanity and more like a circle of intimates, fans, fellow enthusiasts. See also
Hamawaki, “Kant on Beauty and the Normative Force of Feeling.”
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no one requiring [zumuten] others to agree with his judgment of
taste. But in a judgment of taste about beauty we always require oth-
ers to agree. [CJ, §8, p. 57]
To underscore that the person making such a judgment is making a nor-
mative demand and not simply declaring his expectation that he is judging
in accord with general humanity, Kant favors a strongly imperatival lan-
guage to describe the stance assumed by the judgment of beauty. In mak-
ing such a judgment, we “requir[e] others to agree,” we demand (fordern)
that they like it as we do, even: “we permit no one to hold a different
opinion” (CJ, §22, p. 89).17 But to speak in any of these ways raises the
question of what could be the basis for such a requirement, andwhy agree-
ment should matter in this way to the person who finds something beau-
tiful, when for the most part it doesn’t matter that other people find the
Canary wine delightful as he does?18 What could be the source of such a
demand? And given that judgments of the agreeable and of the beautiful
are both judgments of taste, and hence involve a freedom that is not en-
joyed by ordinary empirical judgments, Kant’s insistence on an imperati-
val aspect of the judgment of beauty creates problems for how the
participants in such a dialogue understand what they are doing. For recall
that a judgment of the beautiful is free in the dual sense of not being
determined by a concept of the thing (as is a judgment of something as
good, by contrast) and also not determined by any interest, desire, or need
(as is a judgment of something as agreeable). Thus, Kant puts it, “only the
liking involved in the taste for the beautiful is disinterested and free, since
wearenotcompelledtogiveourapprovalbyanyinterest,whetherofsenseor
of reason” (CJ, §5, p. 52). Just as the person judging something to be beau-
17. On this circle of terms, see footnote 9 here. Guyer’s causal interpretation of the
judgment of taste favors a rendering according to which what is claimed in the judgment is that
all others will agree with it, subject to the proper conditions for the making of such judgments.
As such his view downplays the explicitly normative language in Kant in terms of the demand
for agreement in favor of a factual reading in terms of the prediction of agreement. For support
of the normative understanding of Kant’s language here, Hannah Ginsborg writes: “The
translation thus suggests, in a way that the original does not, that the claim to universal
agreement is factual rather than normative: more specifically, that it is a prediction that others
will agree with our judgment (at least under appropriate circumstances) rather than a strong
normative claim that they ought to agree with it. This is in fact Guyer’s view, but it is a
controversial one” (Hannah Ginsborg, “Critique of the Power of Judgment,” Philosophical
Review 111 [July 2002]: 431–32). Henry E. Allison also insists on the normative reading in his
dialogue with Guyer; see Rebecca Kukla, Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy
[Cambridge, 2006], p. 132), and Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the
Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 104, 130.
18. Indeed, one might think, if they don’t share my good opinion of it, that just means
more Canary wine for me.
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tiful recognizes that he is not compelled by reason, interest, or desire to
acknowledge this thing as beautiful, he must recognize that if others are to
so much as understand the kind of judgment he is making they must
acknowledge themselves as similarly free with respect to it. This is de-
manded by the concept itself. And yet in announcing the judgment of
beauty he expresses himself in terms apparently denying the freedom of
others to judge otherwise (“we permit no one to hold a different opinion”).
Here stands the aesthetic subject, confidently declaring something to be
beautiful, and thereby requiring the agreement of everyone else, when by
his own admission he can offer them neither reasons nor inducements to
comply with this demand. And this is so not because of any inability of his,
because he has not succeeded in finding the right kinds of reasons or
inducements, but rather because of the very nature of the kind of claim he
is trying tomake. Because it is a judgment of beauty (and not, for example,
of goodness or pleasantness) he must both require universal agreement
and at the same time divest himself of any reliance on the authority, rea-
sons, principles, threats, or bribes that could bring his audience to comply
with his requirement. And, indeed if he somehow managed to secure
agreement in any of these ways, this could only mean that he has been
misunderstood by his audience and perhaps that they simply lacked the
concept of the beautiful altogether (and hence could not really know to
what they agree).
If his audience does not lack the concept of the beautiful, and therefore
understands the condition of the autonomy of aesthetic judgment, they
will not simply be disinclined to agree with the speaker, to accede to his
demand for agreement, on the basis of his reasons or his authority. Rather
they will take themselves to be obliged to dismiss anyone who seeks to
compel agreement in such a way, and this will be in virtue of their under-
standing of the autonomy of the very kind of judgment being presented to
them. This is not obstinacy on their part but an appreciation of the logic of
the concept in question. And, indeed, Kant presents just a scene for us:
If someone reads me his poem, or takes me to a play that in the end I
simply cannot find to my taste, then let him adduce Batteaux or Les-
sing to prove that his poem is beautiful . . . moreover, let certain pas-
sages that I happen to dislike conform quite well to rules of beauty (as
laid down by these critics and universally recognized): I shall stop my
ears, shall refuse to listen to reasons and arguments, and shall sooner
assume that those rules of the critics are false, or at least do not apply
in the present case, than allow my judgment to be determined by a
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priori bases of proof; for it is meant to be a judgment of taste, and not
one of the understanding or of reason. [CJ, §33, p. 148]
Hence, if this is how both parties to the discussion understand the auton-
omy of the judgment of taste, this seems to present the spectacle of one
person obliged by the nature of the kind of judgment hemeans to make to
express it in terms requiring the agreement of all others, while at the same
time knowing that his audience finds itself equally under the obligation,
given the nature of the judgment in question, to stop their ears and refuse
to listen. The speaker takes himself to be expressing a perfectly free liking,
a liking that is in fact free in an additional sense to the freedom of an
ordinary expression of pleasure in the agreeable. As Kant says, we recog-
nize the freedom of the taste of sense in the attitude of “allow[ing] every-
one to be of amind of his own, no one requiring [zumuten] others to agree
with his judgment of taste. But in a judgment of taste about beauty we
always require others to agree” (CJ, §8, p. 57).What is strange in this is that,
as we saw, the taste of reflection (judgment of beauty) enjoys the same
freedom as does the ordinary taste of sense and in addition to that is also
free in a way that is not enjoyed by the taste of sense, yet the result seems to
be a restriction on the freedom that is granted to the ordinary judgment of
the agreeable. What we seem to have here, then, is a perfectly free liking of
my own that I nonetheless require of all others. What could ground such a
requirement when it is itself the expression of a liking, a favoring, that is
characterized as beyond (or before) all requirements?
4
Beauty is causally linked with pleasure and inspires love. . . . Plato’s
psychology is more accurate than Kant’s: our earliest impression—
and in that sense our prototype of beauty—is not a wildflower but a
human face, one that is the focus of intense if ambivalent affect.19
Or perhaps what all this suggests is that the liking, the favoring in ques-
tion is not in fact experienced by the person as outside the bounds of all
requirements or obligations after all. If we return to Proust I think we can
see the case for preserving a sense of necessity or requirement as a defining
difference in the experience of the beautiful but one that obliges us to
separate the sense of necessity or requirement in the encounter from the
demand for universal agreement. In this way we can begin to see the aes-
thetic subject as something other than an overbearing person who seeks to
19. Mary Mothersill, Beauty Restored (Oxford 1984), pp. 271, 273.
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impose on others what is for him a perfectly free liking, inventing a re-
quirement out of something that is for himself free of all requirements.
To begin with, not every sense of requirement is universal in form, and
the obligations we feel to certain people, places, or other objects of love are
often such that we can find it impossible even to explain them to another
person, let alone to justify to them in such a way that they could come to
find themselves under the same obligation themselves. Nor would seeking
such agreement always seem to the point or add any missing validation to
the experience or sense of a claim upon oneself. The necessity experienced
and lived out in one’s relation to a person or a vocation does not translate
into a desire for or even the possibility of universal agreement. Obligations
and their necessities can come singly and individualize or even isolate the
person who finds himself subject to one.20We saw something of this in the
youngMarcel’s tearful farewell to his hawthorns, his declaration of love to
them, and his promise to keep faith with them. Proust is hardly the first
writer to be occupied with the relations between the demands of love and
the appeal of beauty, but there may be no one who is more insistent on
figuring the experience of the beautiful itself in explicitly intersubjective
terms (being called to, summoned, or addressed), as if the sense of demand
associated with the beautiful required nothing less. As with the experience
of the beautiful itself, this can take more or less extreme forms and need
not progress to the extremes of making promises or declarations of love.
The experience of the beautiful is not always dramatic or even particularly
intense, and the idea in question is about the category of judgment to
which the beautiful belongs, not the degree of intensity in its experience.
But Proust wants something from the distinction between the beautiful
and the agreeable that Kant also wants, something that is not a difference
in degree of intensity but a difference of logical category, which would
account for a specific sense of requirement in the experience of what we
regard as beautiful that does not apply to our other sources of gratification.
The various sources of gratification exist for us in terms of answering to
our needs and are valued according to how well they perform this service.
But something we are prepared to call beautiful is not measured purely by
its ability to satisfy our given desires but is rather something to which our
20. And as in Harry G. Frankfurt’s discussion of the volitional necessities of love, the
thought is not that love itself is demanded or required but that loving something or someone
creates necessities for the person, marking out the limits of what can coherently be willed,
creating obligations of responsiveness and attention. See Harry G. Frankfurt, The Reasons of
Love (Princeton, N.J., 2004) and Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge, 1998). I discuss the
relations of love and necessity in Richard Moran, “The Reasons of Love by Frankfurt,” review of
The Reasons of Love by Frankfurt, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (Mar. 2007):
463–75.
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pleasure or desires themselves may be answerable, to which theymay need
to conform themselves, or by which they may be instructed. This much, I
would claim, follows from Kant’s original distinction between the agree-
able and the beautiful. And we can put the same point in more explicitly
Proustian terms by relating it to his great theme of disappointment. For it
is when we are prepared to call something beautiful that there is now
logical room not simply for disappointment in one’s experience, as there
might be with respect to any hoped-for source of pleasure, but for disap-
pointment in oneself rather than in the object, for the various possibilities
of failure of responsiveness. With respect to the hawthorns, Marcel makes
a vow that he soon breaks but later makes good on. Later in the story, with
respect to the shifting views of three trees that he sees at evening from a
moving coach, he takes this structure of normativity to what is even for
Proust remarkable extremes, incorporating several of the strands from
beauty’s mythology that we have seen before.
I looked at the three trees; I could see them plainly, but my mind felt
that they were concealing something which it could not grasp, as
when an object is placed out of our reach.
Did they conceal beneath their surface, like the trees, like the tufts
of grass that I had seen beside the Guermantes way, a meaning as ob-
scure, as hard to grasp, as is a distant past, so that, whereas they were
inviting me to prove a new thought, I imagined that I had to identify
an old memory? Or again, were they concealing no hidden thought,
and was it simply visual fatigue that made me see them double in time
as one sometimes sees double in space? I could not tell. . . . I chose
rather to believe that they were phantoms of the past, dear compan-
ions of my childhood, vanished friends who were invoking our com-
mon memories. Like ghosts they seemed to be appealing to me to take
them with me, to bring them back to life. In their simple and passion-
ate gesticulation I could discern the helpless anguish of a beloved per-
son who has lost the power of speech, and feels that he will never be
able to say to us what he wishes to say and we can never guess. Pres-
ently, at a cross-roads, the carriage left them. It was bearing me away
from what alone I believed to be true, what would have made me
truly happy; it was like my life.
I watched the trees gradually recede, waving their despairing arms,
seeming to say to me: “What you fail to learn from us today, you will
never know. If you allow us to drop back into the hollow of this road
from which we sought to raise ourselves up to you, a whole part of
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yourself which we were bringing to you will fall for ever into thin air.”
And indeed if, in the course of time, I did discover the kind of plea-
sure and disquiet which I had felt once again, and if one evening—too
late, but then for all time—I fastened myself to it, of those trees them-
selves I was never to know what they had been trying to give me nor
where else I had seen them. And when, the road having forked and
the carriage with it, I turned my back on them and ceased to see them,
while Mme de Villeparisis asked me what I was dreaming about, I was
as wretched as if I had just lost a dear friend, had died myself, had
broken faith with the dead or repudiated a God.21
Even by Proust’s own exalted standards, the language here is extreme in its
depiction of the experience of being captivated, and its very extremity
helps to make visible a more general idea of norms of responsiveness that
have some claim to define the idea of the beautiful as such. And, as men-
tioned earlier, with any distinct form of normativity there will be distinct
possibilities for violation of the normor failure to conform to its demands.
The youngMarcel breaks his promise to the hawthorns early on butmakes
good on it later. In this passage the forms of normative failure are figured
in terms of the threat of betrayal, fearing that one’s own response will turn
out to have been one of faithlessness or heedlessness, the failure to answer
some question posed to oneself alone, and thus the threat of loss of self or
of the possibility of one’s genuine life. There is a demand here, surely, but
it is not a demand for universal agreement. Rather, it is something whose
consummationwould require him to be alone. And in the reference to “the
helpless anguish of a beloved person who has lost the power of speech”
there is even a proleptic allusion to the death of themost beloved person in
the book, Marcel’s grandmother, who does indeed lose the power of
speech, and the delayed response to whose death, several volumes later, is
the occasion of one of the great cataclysms of his life, an eruption of the
past and the self-reproach for his failures of responsiveness in the present
both when she was alive and for a full year after her death.
While I have been emphasizing the strain in Kant’s account, stemming
from his insistence on the universal imperatival character of the judgment
of beauty, he does himself appeal to the necessities of love to characterize
the specific modality that distinguishes the pleasure of the beautiful from
the pleasure of the agreeable. His formulation, “the beautiful prepares us
for loving something, even nature, without interest; the sublime, for es-
teeming it even against our interest (of sense)” (CJ, §29, p. 127), expresses
21. Proust,Within a Budding Grove, trans. Moncrieff and Kilmartin (New York, 1992), pp.
405, 408; hereafter abbreviated BG.
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the competing side of his thinking that aligns him with a tradition of
thinking about beauty that goes back at least as far as Sappho. It provides
one way to make out the necessity Kant insists on in the judgment of the
beautiful without the need to assimilate it to a demand for universal agree-
ment or to subsume the specific normativity of the beautiful to that of
morality. There are wilder and more measured experiences of the beauti-
ful, after all, and the form of normative requirement in a given case need
not take the dramatic forms described by Proust. We only need to hold
onto the sense that it belongs to the beautiful but not to the agreeable and
that there can be types of responses or ways of treating the thing that are
called for, merited by, or owed to it and hence that there are possibilities
for characteristic failures of response or repudiations of the appeal that
have no place in our relation to the agreeable things we consume. When
Plato or Mary Mothersill claim an internal relation between beauty and
love,22 this needn’t be understood as either sentimentalizing or inflating
the experience of the beautiful but rather as a recognition of the conceptual
difference between something’s being a value because it answers to my
needs and recognizing somethingwhose claimonme is independent ofmy
needs, a value thatmy needs and desires are themselves answerable to. Part
ofwhat itmeans to say that “beauty inspires love”must be that the pleasure
it causes is experienced as the recognition of a value to which my present
interests and desires are themselves answerable or by which they are to be
measured and hence a value that can create obligations (of attention, pres-
ervation, understanding, communicating, and so on). If a certain kind of
pleasure can be said to inspire love, then thatmeans that it nowprovides us
with something it is possible to be true to or not, to betray or not, to keep
faith with or not.
Both Kant and Proust want to identify something unconditional in the
appeal of beauty. And we might see one aspect of the unconditional in the
appeal of beauty that is shared by both Kant and Proust as emerging fairly
directly from the distinction between the pleasure of the beautiful and the
22. “By beauty [as distinguished from the sublime], I mean that quality or those qualities in
bodies by which they cause love, or some passion similar to it. . . . I likewise distinguish love, by
which I mean that satisfaction which arises to the mind upon contemplating anything beautiful
. . . from desire . . . which is an energy of the mind, that hurries us on to the possession of
certain objects” (Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the
Sublime and Beautiful [Oxford, 1990], p. 83). Alexander Nehamas’s Only a Promise of Happiness
came out as I was completing this paper, and, among its other virtues, his account both
explores the conceptual connections between beauty and love and appeals to this connection by
way of rejecting the claim for universal agreement. See Alexander Nehamas, “Beauty,
Community, Universality,” Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art
(Princeton, N.J., 2007), pp. 78–84.
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pleasure in the agreeable: the idea of a demand on the subject that is inde-
pendent of one’s current likes and dislikes. This is clear enough in Kant
and is part of his definition of the autonomy of the beautiful. For Proust,
we can begin by noting that the experiences he relates in passages like these
are not descriptions of the gratification of some antecedently existing ap-
petite for either hawthorns or the shifting appearances of trees as seen from
amoving coach. Rather, the value they represent for him does not depend
on their answering to his preexisting desires. Kantmay sometimes write as
if recognizing such a value were incompatible with the felt desire for the
bearers of such values or required the suppression of such desire, but
surely that is amistake. The point is that the value in question and its claim
uponme is recognized as not conditional onmy having such desires. And,
for both writers, the idea of something whose status as a value does not
depend on my current desires or interests brings to the experience of that
value a sense of my being measured by it (rather than my estimating it
according to my own needs) and a normative direction of fit from oneself
to the beautiful object rather than the reverse. The standard English trans-
lation of the German angenehm as “agreeable” is apt for expressing this
contrast. For when there is failure of fit between my appetite and the food
and drink I consume, we speak of it as “not agreeing with me,” and with
that the meal is dismissed, whereas when I am prepared to think of some-
thing as beautiful the question of my being in agreement or not with it is
more centrally the question the aesthetic subject is faced with. Here the
possibilities of failure of agreement are not limited to bringing the object
into line with one’s desire but can expand from disappointment in one’s
own responsiveness, to the sense of lost receptivity thematized for example
in the odes to loss and dejection of William Wordsworth and Samuel
Taylor Coleridge and on to Proust’s deliberately hyperbolic description of
himself as feeling “as wretched as though I had just lost a friend, had died
myself, had broken faith with the dead or repudiated a God.” (Where Kant
joins Proust is in finding room in the idea of beauty for the possibility of
being chastened or humbled by the experience, finding one’s own response
to it to be inadequate.)
The sense of a demand or requirement as characterizing the experience
of the beautiful brings a dimension of normativity to the judgment of
beauty that distinguishes it from both the ordinary empirical judgment of
something as, for example, red and the more explicitly evaluative judg-
ment of something as pleasant or agreeable. I have been arguing that this
represents one of Kant’s best insights about the beautiful, but I have also
been suggesting that his particular ways of elucidating this dimension of
normativity are unsuccessful, even within his own terms. In this paper I
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won’t attempt to address with any adequacy the terms of Kant’s positive
account, but I do want to say something about two main lines of this
account and what I see as unsatisfying about them. To begin with, it might
be argued that we create an unnecessary air of mystery by speaking of
something normative or demanding as issuing from the beautiful itself
when it should be clear that the only genuine demand in question here is
the one Kant explicitly insists on, namely, a demand coming from another
person, that is, the demand for agreement with his judgment. Part of the
problem with any response in these terms is that it doesn’t help us under-
stand what the source of this demand itself could be and how it could be,
for Kant, the primary feature that distinguishes the judgment of beauty
from the judgment of the agreeable. If we acknowledge that we do not
demand such agreement with regard to what we find agreeable, even
though as Kant also acknowledges we may have better reason to expect
actual agreement there than in the case of the beautiful, then the particular
demand for agreement contained in the judgment of the beautiful cannot
be explained by reference to the normativity of either ordinary empirical
judgments or declarations about genuine sources of pleasure. It must have
some different basis, and the personmaking such a demand for agreement
cannot understand himself to be backing this demand with the claim that
he has, after all, identified a genuine source of pleasure here, one that you
are obliged to share with him in enjoying.23 To refer the sense of require-
ment back to the person making a demand for agreement simply pushes
back the question of why there should be any importance to agreement
here that there is not with respect to our other pleasures and what it could
be about this experience and the person’s relation to it that puts him in a
position from which he could make such a demand, a demand that an-
other person would have any reason to respect. If we begin simply with
one’s experience of some kind of pleasure, something that is a perfectly free
liking, then it is hard to see how adding to it a demand for universal
23.
But surely there is something strange here. In the case of the taste of sense, not only does
experience show that its judgment (of a pleasure or displeasure we take in something or
other) does not hold universally, but people, of their own accord, are modest enough not
even to require others to agree (even though there actually is, at times, very widespread
agreement in these judgments too). Now, experience teaches us that the taste of reflection,
with its claim that its judgment (about the beautiful) is universally valid for everyone, is also
rejected often enough. What is strange is that the taste of reflection should nonetheless find
itself able (as it actually does) to conceive of judgments that can demand such agreement,
and that it does in fact require this agreement from everyone for each it its judgments. [CJ,
§8, p. 58]
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agreement can by itself contribute any special normativity to the situation
or bring us closer to the concept of the beautiful. So far it remains simply
a pleasure of mine to which I have added the otherwise unmotivated re-
quirement that others agree with me.
In response to such difficulties, some commentators on Kant wish to
show that the imperatival character of the judgment of beauty is in fact
dispensable in Kant and does not in fact mark anything distinct from the
normativity of ordinary empirical judgments.24 My own view is that Kant
is right in this, as well as in agreement with Proust, in finding a sense of
necessity or demand with respect to the beautiful that is not found with
respect to either the agreeable or ordinary empirical judgments. However,
he mislocates it in the demand for universal agreement, in part because
necessity and universality are so deeply conjoined for him. (The passages
from Proust and the relations between the experience of beauty and the
necessities of love are meant to remind us that not all necessities take that
universal form.) Kant is clear that something normative needs to under-
write the demand for universal agreement, and he is also clear that no sense
of requirement can be derived simply from the goodness of pleasure itself.
That is, if I demand universal agreement in the pleasure I take in some-
thing, my reason cannot be that otherwise you would be missing out on a
true source of pleasure, which is a genuine good. However heartfelt, any
recommendation of that sortmay legitimately be dismissed, either because
you doubt that we do take pleasure in the same things or because you are
perfectly satisfied with the sources of pleasure with which you are already
familiar. You may not doubt me about my own pleasure or that I have
identified a possible source of pleasure for you, yet you may still find that
all this has no claim upon you. And, perhaps more importantly from
Kant’s own perspective, nothing of that character could explicate the sense
of requirement in the judgment of beauty since, as he puts it, “an obliga-
tion to enjoy oneself is a manifest absurdity” (CJ, §4, p. 50 n. 17).
It is, I think, because his original distinction between the agreeable and
the beautiful is characterized in terms of a sense of obligation or require-
ment attaching to the one but not the other (something I’m claiming is
shared by Proust) and because he recognizes the need for an account of its
24. Compare to Mothersill: “That idea is strongly counter-intuitive. Nothing would be lost
if judgments were treated as assertions (or declarative sentences), as candidates for truth,” and
“in short, the idea of an aesthetic imperative seems a liability to Kant’s theory from every point
of view” (Mothersill, Beauty Restored, pp. 211, 218). Note that she is disagreeing with Kant here
and not with the “normative” or imperatival interpretation of Kant. Throughout this paper I
am trying to tease out what is correct in Kant’s appeal to a normative element in the judgment
of beauty that is additional to the norms for correct empirical judgment quite generally (for
example, color judgments). Such judgments can still for all that be candidates for truth.
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basis that throughout the Critique of Judgment he makes various attempts
to locate the source of this normativity somewhere or other, primarily and
predictably in the demands of morality. So, for instance, he argues that we
require that all others take disinterested pleasure in the beauty of the nat-
ural world because the capacity to do somakes usmore fit for themoral life
(see CJ, §40, pp. 159–62). Or alternatively it may be that a capacity for
disinterested pleasure is at least a reliable sign of moral sensitivity and
hence to be welcomed and approved of (even, that is, if we are unsure of its
independent contribution to good moral character) (see CJ, §42, pp. 165–
70). Or, in a different register, Kant will suggest that the possibility of our
finding beauty in the world encourages us in our faith that pure practical
reason can actually be effective in the empirical world because the experi-
ence of beauty intimates that we are in some sense, after all, made for each
other, fitted to each other’s requirements (see CJ, §§42, 57, pp. 165–70,
211–20). And taking these and other considerations together may bring us
to the idea that beauty is in fact a symbol of morality (see CJ, §59, pp.
225–30). I will make no attempt to do justice to these large questions, and
although I am skeptical about this entire line of thought I will not defend
that skepticism here beyond mentioning my sense that the very diversity
and inconclusiveness of the relations Kant suggests between beauty and
morality indicates to me that they have a tentative or at least unresolved
status in his overall argument. However, even if no objection is made to
any of the claims justmentioned, either individually or collectively, I think
it can be argued that even their truth would not provide us with an answer
to the question that Kant originally posed for us.
For that was a question about the normative force of a claim in response
to a particular experience of beauty, a normative dimension that is distinct
from the normativity of an ordinary empirical judgment or the recom-
mendation to avail oneself of a source of pleasure. And the sense of re-
quirement associated with this particular experience of something
beautiful cannot be explicated by reference to a quite general obligation to
cultivate one’s capacity for disinterested pleasures (so as to provide “a
transition from sense enjoyment to moral feeling” [CJ, §41, p. 164]). This
was our original problem, the special normative dimension of the singular
judgment of beauty and how it could underwrite the demand for universal
agreement, even though Kant is equally insistent that the pleasure in ques-
tion is a perfectly “free liking” and that any such agreement could not be
required by reference to concepts or principles. We would not be closer to
understanding this even if we were convinced by Kant’s claim of the “In-
tellectual Interest in the Beautiful” that “to take a direct interest in the
beauty of nature (not merely to have the taste needed to judge it) is always
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a mark of a good soul; and that, if this interest is habitual, if it readily
associates itself with the contemplation of nature, this [fact] indicates a
mental attunement favorable to moral feeling” (CJ, §42, pp. 165–66). And
this is because, for Kant, any judgment of taste, whether of the beautiful or
the agreeable, is a singular judgment, and hence whatever normativity
characterizes it and distinguishes it from the agreeable cannot be under-
stood by reference to the moral recommendation to cultivate a sensibility
for pleasure and judgments of that general type.25
I would also argue that the appeal to morality suggests the wrong role
for agreement in the experience of beauty and thewrong importance for it.
There are obvious reasons concerned with the nature of morality why the
very demandingness of the moral should be understood in terms of the
conditions for securing agreement between people. Moral and political
conflicts are a fact of life and can exact a terrible price on the contenders
involved because they have to live together and find ways to respect and
make comprehensible the demands they make on each other. While it is
true that our different experiences of beauty can be painful or alienating in
certain circumstances, they do not demand resolution and agreed-upon
terms of fair agreement before civil life can resume.26 And we differ in our
experiences of the agreeable aswell, though asKant notes, in these contexts
we are “modest enough not to require others to agree” (CJ, §8, p. 57), even
when we are aware that, in fact, actual agreement about the agreeable is
oftenmorewidespread than agreement about the beautiful. It seems that it
could only be our different attitude toward the beautiful itself that could
account for why we should ever treat our experiences of the beautiful any
differently, taking that additional step when we know it is likely to be
repudiated. But that, I’ve been suggesting, requires detaching the demand
for agreement from the sense of necessity or requirement in the experience
itself.
If Proust’s narrator can understand himself to bemaking a vow of some
sort to his hawthorns, what he is doing is meant to place himself under an
obligation, something like the vow to remain responsive to this beauty
25. “It is a fact that any judgment of taste is always a singular judgment about the object”
(CJ, §33, p. 148). “That is also why all judgments of taste are singular judgments, because they
do not connect their predicate, the liking, with a concept but with a singular empirical
presentation that is given” (CJ, §37, p. 154).
26. Compare John Rawls: “A second contrast between the right and the good is that it is, in
general, a good thing that individuals’ conceptions of their good should differ in significant
ways, whereas this is not so for conceptions of right. . . . Moreover, there is no urgency to reach
a publicly accepted judgment as to what is the good of particular individuals. The reasons that
make such an agreement necessary in questions of justice do not obtain for judgments of value”
(John Rawls, A Theory of Justice [Cambridge, Mass., 1999], p. 393).
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because it defines him. This is a kind of imperative addressed to himself,
but it is something different from a demand for universal agreement. In
making a vow to the hawthorns and promising that he will be true to them
in spite of the pleasures and distractions of “paying calls and listening to
silly talk,” he is both affirming the superior value of the hawthorns and
attempting to bind himself to that value. He feels the binding is necessary
not only because of the temptations of gossiping in the city but because he
feels that the appeal of the hawthorns, however intense, is nonetheless
something fragile, and, that were he to lose his responsiveness to this ap-
peal, it would count as a loss of the self he presently is and cares about. By
contrast, the experience of the agreeable does not carry with it a similar
threat. With respect to something agreeable, to lose one’s desire for it is
typically to find something elsemore agreeable or equally so andmove on.
There need be no experience of the loss of some part of oneself and hence
nothing to mourn or regret in this change of tastes. Marcel does not mea-
sure himself against his responsiveness to the agreeable, and he doesn’t
make vows to their objects because the possibility of ceasing to find them a
source of pleasure is not something he needs to preserve himself against,
because that possibility is not experienced as any kind of failure on his part.
Within the general economy of the agreeable, if I am tempted by some-
thing else that distractsme frommy original desire, I have no reason, apart
from prudential or moral considerations extrinsic to the desire itself, not
to follow what happens to please me more and abandon what no longer
pleases me as much. Binding oneself against loss or lapse is not called for,
and therefore there is no sense to a vow of any kind. With respect to the
beautiful, however, he claims a value in continuing to cherish this object,
continuing to be responsive to its appeal, which is over and above the value
of the pleasure it presently gives him and may survive it. In regarding the
beautiful or an object of love, there is room for the idea of failure in the
possibility of the abandonment or replacement of one’s desire, the pros-
pect of which is experienced as a threat to the self. It is this threat that
Marcel shrinks from when Swann suggests to him that if he moved away
from France and formed other attachments he would not be tormented by
Gilberte or other unattainable objects of his desire. But the prospect of
other attachments, along with the forgetting of his current ones and thus
the relief from the suffering they are now causing him are not seen by him
as any form of compensation for or solution to his current sufferings but
only as adding to them. Swann is here representing the perspective of an
enlightened egoistic hedonism, according to which the elimination of an
unfulfilled longing can count in the same way as a satisfied desire in the
economy of pleasure. Marcel recognizes a certain hedonic rationality in
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this perspective, and he feels the claim of what he calls his “better judg-
ment” here,27 and yet he recoils from Swann’s suggestion as entailing the
obliteration of the self whose future well-being could matter to him in the
first place. The abandonment recommended by Swann and the perspective
of the rationalmanagement of the agreeable is regarded by himwith dread:
this dread, far from being dissipated, is intensified, if to the pain of
such a privation we feel that there will be added what seems to us now
in anticipation more painful still: not to feel it as a pain at all—to re-
main indifferent; for then our old self would have changed . . . it
would be in a real sense the death of the self, a death followed, it is
true, by resurrection, but in a different self, to the love of which the
elements of the existing self that are condemned to die cannot bring
themselves to aspire. [BG, p. 340]
Both Kant and Proust could say that Marcel knows his experience of
beauty presents him with something in the form of a normative demand
that is not contained in the experience of the agreeable because it is the
beautiful and not anything he findsmerely agreeable (and this is the whole
force of the “mere” in this context) that presents himwith the possibility of
something hemight fail or stray from. And for both of them in response to
the beautiful, acknowledging the possibility of characteristic forms of fail-
ure of responsemeans acknowledging oneself as subject to somethingwith
the force of a requirement. Many writers have wanted to describe the
encounter with beauty in terms of the claim of something outside the
world of egoistic desire and in this way provide a place for the ideas of
objectivity, impersonality, and universality as applied to beauty. This is
only partly Kant’s way. He shares the sense of the concept of beauty being
reserved for something outside of and imposing itself upon egoistic desire
27.
And yet my . . . better judgment whispered: “What difference can that make, since you
won’t be distressed by it? When M. Swann tells you that you won’t come back he means
by that that you won’t want to come back, and if you don’t want to that is because
you’ll be happier out there.” For my judgment was aware that Habit . . . undertakes as
well to make dear to us the companions whom at first we disliked, to give another ap-
pearance to their faces, to make the sound of their voices attractive, to modify the incli-
nations of their hearts. It is true that these new friendships for places and people are
based upon forgetfulness of the old; but my reason precisely thought that I could envis-
age without dread the prospect of a life in which I should be for ever separated from
people all memory of whom I should lose, and it was by way of consolation that my
mind was offering to my heart a promise of oblivion which succeeded only in sharpen-
ing the edge of its despair. [BG, p. 339]
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and hence as being impersonal or at any rate transpersonal in its meaning.
And while he does, of course, seek to join this to a claim to universality, he
differs from other writers on beauty in seeking to maintain such univer-
sality while, for principled reasons, denying that beauty is any kind of
objective property of things (not even of the sort belonging to secondary
qualities such as colors). This is indeed his central paradox.28 Without
claiming that Proust solves this paradox, we can see that he draws our
attention to a dimension of the aesthetic that fits better with the logical
form of the kind of claim Kant wants to make for beauty, while avoiding
the internally problematic features of demands for universal agreement,
even universal enjoyment that can’t be met on his own terms, whether
because pleasure, like any other affect, cannot coherently be commanded,
or because “an obligation to enjoy oneself is a manifest absurdity” (CJ, §4,
p. 50 n. 17), or because the autonomy of the judgment of taste obliges
anyone in possession of the concept of that kind of judgment to dismiss
any such demand for “approval by any interest, whether of sense or of
reason” (CJ, §5, p. 52). Proust will agree with Kant that an invocation of
necessity is needed to carve out the concept of the beautiful from the
indifferent mass of the merely agreeable and consumable. But instead of
the juridical, legislating context favored by Kant here and elsewhere,
Proust is concerned instead with the necessity whose source is the thing
itself in front of him, the one that has arrested his attention.
28. See Ginsborg, “Kant on the Subjectivity of Taste,” in Kant’s Aesthetics, ed. Herman
Parret (Berlin, 1998) for an especially helpful discussion of this paradox and Kant’s principled
reasons for denying that beauty can have the kind of objectivity of any ordinary property. I have
profited from this paper in several ways.
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